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Transnational Human Rights Litigation
A Means of Obtaining Effective Remedy Abroad?
Angela Lindt
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Abstract: In recent years, various transnational corporations (TNCs) have 
faced legal proceedings in their home states for human rights violations 
and environmental damage committed abroad. These transnational law­
suits are an attempt to overcome corporate impunity and establish trans­
national chains of responsibility. At the same time, the individual legal 
cases are marked by procedural and legal hurdles and may entail the risk 
of social costs for claimants. In this article, I explore what such trans­
national lawsuits can contribute from the perspective of social movements 
in the Global South. Taking the Monterrico case from Peru as an  example, 
I discuss the expectations of human rights lawyers in such cases and the 
relevant legal mechanisms. By focusing on out­of­court settlements, I 
argue that, from the perspective of the Global South actors involved in the 
case study, adjudication and the related judicial practices are fundamental 
to making the law effective.
Keywords: adjudication, human rights lawyers, legal expectations, out­
of­court settlements, Peru, transnational corporate responsibility
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Corporate impunity for human rights violations is increasingly ques­
tioned, contested, and opposed. Transnational corporations (TNCs) can 
no longer be sure that crimes they commit will remain unobserved, 
even when they occur in connection with the activities of their subsid­
iaries in the Global South. In recent years, non­governmental organiza­
tions (NGOs) and other civil society organizations have reported many 
such instances of wrongdoing and brought legal actions against parent 
companies. Leading TNCs such as Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron, Xstrata, 
BHP Billiton, Newmont Mining, Vedanta Resources, Unilever, Nestlé, 
and Chiquita have all had to confront legal proceedings in their home 
states for crimes committed by subsidiaries abroad (Blackburn 2017; 
Skinner et al. 2013). In Anglo­Saxon countries, in particular, NGOs and 
private law firms have filed ‘foreign direct liability cases’ against TNCs 
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(Enneking 2014; Zerk 2006: 198). Such claims have raised considerable 
expectations, although the legal proceedings have advanced slowly 
and the majority of cases have been dismissed or settled out of court 
( Aristova 2018: 20).
In this article, I examine what such transnational claims can 
achieve in practice. I analyse how human rights lawyers from the 
Global South perceive the approach of suing TNCs at home and study 
the legal expectations they have in such cases. By observing their ex­
pectations towards the law and towards specific legal mechanisms, my 
aim is to contribute to the debate on the functioning of law as a social 
practice. Legal disputes take place in specific social contexts and are 
shaped by power relations, conflicts of interest, and political struggles. 
They expose individuals and lead to the individualization of political 
conflicts. The article sheds light on the functioning of law beyond its 
merely judicial mechanisms. I ask what is gained and what is lost in 
such transnational proceedings and argue that if we take a closer look 
at what actually happens in these lawsuits, we can observe how law 
becomes effective in claims against TNCs.
This article is the result of a research project on the human rights 
movement and the judicialization of mining conflicts in Peru. In 
under taking this research, I analyse how Peruvian social movements 
and NGOs mobilize law to bring about social change through legal 
 activism.1 Peru’s human rights movement is part of a transnational 
network that is challenging the impunity of TNCs. Although most 
Peruvian human rights lawyers focus their struggles on the domestic 
justice system, there have been attempts to bring claims abroad and to 
sue TNCs in their home states. In this article, I trace one of the most 
emblematic cases in this regard: the Monterrico case.
The Monterrico case is a lawsuit that emerged from human rights 
abuses committed in the context of an industrial mining project in Peru. 
The lawsuit was brought before a court in London and eventually led 
to an out-of-court settlement. The parent company paid financial com­
pensation to the claimants but did not admit any liability. Settlements 
of this kind are a common outcome of transnational human rights liti­
gation—at least in cases that are not dismissed, something that is still 
more frequent. Settling a case means securing financial compensation 
for the claimants and avoiding the risk of going to trial. Out­of­court 
settlements are thus a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) 
(Nader 1999). They make adjudication unnecessary or impossible, sup­
posedly functioning according to a ‘harmony law model’ (Nader 1999). 
This article takes a closer look at the outcomes of this type of settlement 
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and asks how they differ from other legal mechanisms, such as trials 
and adjudication. In particular, it examines the extent the settlement in 
the Monterrico case served as an ‘effective remedy’ in the perception of 
Peruvian human rights lawyers.
The term ‘effective remedy’ has its origin in international law. The 
right to obtain ‘effective remedy’ is enshrined in the International Cov­
enant on Civil and Political Rights,2 which ensures access to the judicial 
system and to due process. In recent years, the term has been used 
extensively in debates on business and human rights, where it has been 
deployed to underline efforts to overcome corporate impunity. Despite 
the widespread use of the term, however, it often remains unclear what 
it actually means for the actors involved in a legal dispute. What do 
lawsuits have to contribute in order to be ‘effective’? In this article, I 
use ‘effective remedy’ as an analytic term to help understand which 
mechanisms of law are considered effective by the Peruvian human 
rights lawyers. On the one hand, the focus on the remedy asks what law 
can and should contribute to in order to indemnify suffered harm. On 
the other hand, the term asks for the effectiveness of law and examines 
whether legal mechanisms can become ‘emancipatory’ (Santos 2002) for 
the struggles of human rights movements.
Challenging corporate impunity
To illustrate how the term effective remedy is used, I would like to refer to 
an observation I made during the United Nations’ 6th Forum on Busi­
ness and Human Rights in 2017. In his opening remarks to the forum, 
Surya Deva, the then chairperson of the working group that organized 
the event, underlined the importance of access to effective remedy: ‘The 
sad reality is that access to effective remedy for the victims . . . remains 
an exception, rather than the rule.’ The event Deva was opening aimed 
to improve this situation. Its motto was ‘Realizing Access to Effective 
Remedy’. Thereby the organizers were seeking to address a core compo­
nent of the United Nations’ Guiding Principles on Business and Human 
Rights (UNGPs). The UNGPs’ third pillar requires states to guarantee 
access to remedy ‘through judicial, administrative, legislative or other 
appropriate means’ (UNHRC 2011: 22).
During the forum, however, I could observe how different groups of 
participants were talking at cross purposes. Representatives of business 
stressed their engagement for human rights, which in practice means 
involvement in corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes and 
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non­judicial grievance mechanisms. State actors stressed the National 
Action Plans (NAPs) their countries had elaborated to implement the 
UNGPs nationally. Representatives of international NGOs, meanwhile, 
insisted that access to remedy means access to the systems of justice in 
the TNCs’ home states.
Hardly anyone talked about bringing human rights violations to 
courts in the host states, that is, in the countries where TNCs operate. 
There seemed to be a consensus that access to remedy in the countries 
of the Global South was ‘unrealistic’ anyway and that the search for 
the means to compensate for harm therefore had to be centred on the 
Global North. This reflects a global tendency, as a great deal of hope is 
currently being invested in the attribution of corporate responsibility 
in home states. This is because it is considered more feasible to bring 
lawsuits in companies’ home states—or at least less unrealistic than 
bringing claims in the host states. Furthermore, the strategy implies 
that doing business globally should result in the attribution of re­
sponsibility globally. Not only profits should flow northwards, there 
should also exist chains of responsibility linking sites of operation in 
the Global South to the TNCs’ headquarters (see Eckert and Knöpfel 
this issue). The law is a forum for the pursuit of claims in these trans­
national disputes that seek to address the discrepancy between TNCs’ 
profits and corporate impunity.
This legal activism directed at TNCs is to be understood in the 
context of a growing ‘juridification’ of social conflicts, a phenomenon 
that has been observed worldwide (see, for example, Eckert et al. 2012; 
Sieder 2010). Claims filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA)3 
in the United States pioneered this form of legal activism (Deva 2012: 
66–74; Enneking 2014: 44–49). The ATCA experience exemplified how 
NGOs and human rights lawyers were strategically searching for legal 
routes to hold TNCs liable at home. In various countries, the law pro­
vides access points for such claims. Lawyers attempt to track down 
these points and to make strategic use of them. At the same time, the 
ATCA experience demonstrated the obstacles that still stand in the 
way of access to justice systems in the Global North, despite these legal 
possibilities, and revealed corporate opposition to legal investigations. 
TNCs prefer non-judicial grievance mechanisms to solve conflicts, and, 
whenever possible, internal corporate mechanisms. They mobilize all 
the legal, jurisdictional, and procedural means available to have law­
suits dismissed.
The legal principles they invoke include, first, the forum non con­
veniens doctrine, which states that courts can dismiss claims if there is 
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another more suitable jurisdiction available to hear them. In the Euro­
pean Union, a landmark decision by the European Court of Justice 
overcame this doctrine,4 but in many non­EU Anglo­Saxon countries it 
remains a hurdle when it comes to suing parent companies (Blackburn 
2017: 38–39). A second legal obstacle is what is known as the ‘corpo­
rate veil’ principle, which comes into play because of the structure of 
TNCs. This principle stipulates that parent companies and subsidiaries 
are separate entities and that the former cannot be held liable for the 
misconduct of the latter, thereby hindering the creation of global re­
sponsibility chains (Skinner et al. 2013: 69; Skinner 2014: 214–215). This 
obstacle has been challenged by suing parent companies for a breach 
of ‘duty of care’ or ‘due diligence’, rather than for a direct involvement 
in abuses. Hence, the strategy is not to ‘pierce’, but to circumvent the 
‘corporate veil’ (Zerk 2014: 46).
Experience with transnational lawsuits has revealed, however, that 
a progressive legal basis is not sufficient, as procedural hurdles may 
exist that can still make court proceedings impossible. This includes, for 
example, a high burden of proof and the fact that evidence is in the pos­
session of corporate defendants (Blackburn 2017: 54). Further problems 
derive from strict statute of limitation rules, given that it often takes 
many years to bring transnational cases to court (Skinner et al. 2013: 7, 
39, 40). Moreover, most people who have suffered corporate abuses and 
become claimants in transnational lawsuits are what Marc Galanter 
calls ‘one-shotters’ (1974: 97). They often belong to marginalized groups, 
live in remote areas and have no litigation experience, which means that 
they lack knowledge about legal proceedings (Kirsch 2014: 85). Follow­
ing Galanter’s terminology, TNCs, in turn, are ‘repeat players’ (1974: 
97). They have extensive financial resources and long-term experience 
in law and are therefore more likely to ‘come out ahead’ (1974: 97) in 
court. Claimants rely on lawyers who are experienced enough to con­
front the proverbial ‘army of corporate lawyers’ and are willing to be 
involved in risky litigation for years without knowing if they will ever 
recover their own expenses. The fact that transnational human rights 
litigation is extremely expensive can make claims unfeasible. Lawyers 
who take such cases are rare; they often work for human rights NGOs 
or pro bono law firms (Enneking 2014: 48). Thus, transnational human 
rights litigation is risky, costly, and marked by various obstacles, many 
of which also shaped the Monterrico case.
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The Río Blanco mining conflict
The Monterrico case has its origin in the conflict over the Río Blanco 
mining project in Piura, in Peru’s northern highlands. For more than fif­
teen years now, a TNC has planned to build a copper and molybdenum 
mine in this region (Velazco Rondón and Quedena Zambrano 2015). The 
project was led by a Peruvian subsidiary, which was initially known 
by the name of Majaz but later changed its name to Río Blanco. Río 
Blanco was wholly owned by the British corporation Monterrico Metals 
( Bebbington et al. 2007: 14). In 2003, the Peruvian government granted 
the concession to operate, and the corporation built a mining camp 
(Skinner et al. 2013: 93). Due to local resistance, however, construction 
of the mine was suspended. The company has remained active in the 
region and attempted to obtain the ‘social license to operate’ through 
CSR projects. In 2007, Monterrico Metals’ assets were taken over by the 
Chinese company Zijin Mining (Kamphuis 2011: 74). In recent years, 
the project has been promoted again by the Peruvian government 
as part of its attempts to deepen economic cooperation with China 
(Amancio 2016).
The planned mine is geographically located in an area with a vul­
nerable ecosystem (Bebbington et al. 2007: 15). It is situated on land be­
longing to the comunidades campesinas of Yanta and Segunda y Cajas, two 
peasant communities which hold official land titles. Members of these 
comunidades fear the mine’s negative impacts on the water supply and 
on local agriculture. They have also reported irregularities in the com­
pany’s land purchase. Members of the local communities have opposed 
the mine by organizing protest marches. In 2007, a consulta vecinal, a 
local referendum, was held. This was not legally binding, but revealed 
the extent of local opposition to the project (Hoetmer 2010: 185).
One event in the conflict over the Río Blanco project has been 
particularly deeply etched in the collective memory. In 2005, the op­
position movement marched to the mine camp in protest, where they 
were attacked by police forces. One comunero was killed and several 
people were injured (Bebbington et al. 2007: 17–18; Skinner et al. 2013: 
94). Twenty­eight people were detained by the Peruvian National Police 
and held within the camp for three days (Kamphuis 2011: 75). Inside the 
camp, the detainees allegedly suffered physical and psychological vio­
lence, as well as acts of torture. They were beaten, subjected to tear gas, 
and threatened with violence and death. Among the detainees were 
two women and one minor. The two women suffered sexual abuse. For 
several hours, the detainees received neither food nor water; plastic 
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bags containing an irritating powder were placed over their heads; they 
had to sit for a long time with their hands tied (Kamphuis 2012: 544). 
Members of the National Police as well as employees of a private secu­
rity company and the mining company were present during the events 
(Kamphuis 2011: 77). Moreover, a local prosecutor visited the site, but 
did not intervene, although he was able to observe the mistreatment 
(Velazco Rondón and Quedena Zambrano 2015: 51).
On the third day, the detainees were released. A few days later, 
they were charged by the local authorities for participating in the pro­
test march. The judicial authorities thus initiated criminal proceedings 
against the protesters while simultaneously ignoring the abuses they 
had suffered. The detainees themselves filed a criminal complaint in 
June 2008 with the support of the NGO Fundación Ecuménica para 
el Desarrollo y La Paz (Fedepaz).5 Fedepaz is a national human rights 
organization based in Lima and had provided legal assistance to the 
affected comunidades for many years. Founded in the early 1990s, the 
NGO has extensive experience in litigating human rights violations 
committed by state actors in the context of the extractive industries.
Shortly after the complaint was filed, the national newspaper La 
República published photographs showing the violence against the dem­
onstrators. Despite the publication of these pictures, however, the crim­
inal proceedings have faced considerable difficulties over the years. The 
complaint demanded that the responsibility of both the police and the 
mining company be clarified. The public prosecutor, in turn, limited 
investigations to the involved police officers and their superiors. Over 
the years, the judicial authorities have repeatedly closed the case. Al­
though Fedepaz successfully appealed these decisions, the case pro­
ceeded very slowly and has to this day still not reached the procedural 
stage of the trial.
Proceedings in London
In view of the judicial difficulties in Peru, Fedepaz, in collaboration 
with the Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos, the national 
umbrella organization of Peru’s human rights NGOs, searched for legal 
options abroad. They consulted various international allies, including 
the Environmental Defender Law Center (EDLC) in the United States, 
which then established contact with Leigh Day, a British law firm. In 
2009, Leigh Day filed a civil claim at the High Court in London against 
Monterrico Metals and its Peruvian subsidiary.6 Fedepaz and the 
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 Coordinadora were involved in bringing the claim. They established 
contact with the claimants in Piura and provided Leigh Day with infor­
mation on the Peruvian criminal case. Leigh Day’s lawyers travelled to 
Peru several times and hired an assistant to maintain contact with the 
claimants and to conduct on­site research.
Leigh Day is a private law firm that has been involved in various 
lawsuits against UK-based corporations for human rights abuses com­
mitted abroad (Leigh Day 2020: 2). Working on a pro bono basis, it has 
attempted to push the boundaries of English tort law in order to estab­
lish the principle that parent companies owe a ‘duty of care’ for their 
subsidiaries’ wrongdoings (Brett 2018: 55–56; Leigh Day 2020: 7). Leigh 
Day is one of those few law firms mentioned above that have the experi­
ence and are willing to bring claims against TNCs in the Global North. 
Over the years, the firm has led various cases to an out-of-court settle­
ment. This means that claimants were paid financial compensation, and 
Leigh Day was able to cover its litigation costs. On the other hand, this 
practice of settlements meant that the UK courts have to date not de­
cided whether parent companies actually owe a duty of care ( Aristova 
2018: 20). None of Leigh Day’s cases has so far set this precedent.7
The claim against Monterrico Metals initially looked promising and 
proceeded relatively rapidly. Leigh Day argued that the parent com­
pany had ‘exercised effective control’ over the Peruvian subsidiary’s 
management and that ‘officers of Rio [sic] Blanco or of Monterrico ought 
to have intervened so as to have prevented the abuses of the Claimants’ 
human rights’.8 The claim was made on behalf of thirty­two claimants, 
including the twenty­eight detained persons and the relatives of the 
comunero who was killed when the police forces intervened against the 
protesters. The claim described the group’s detention as a ‘joint opera­
tion’ involving members of the Peruvian National Police and employ­
ees of both the security company and the mining company.9 Corporate 
defendants, in turn, asked the court to dismiss the claim, arguing 
that ‘there was no evidence that Rio [sic] Blanco or Monterrico were 
in any way responsible for the violence’ that occurred.10 In addition, 
they argued that the case was time barred and that ‘there was no good 
reason why the Claimants were unable to secure legal redress in Peru’.11
The allegation of torture was, via its translation into English tort 
law, transformed into a case of ‘negligence’. According to a British 
lawyer familiar with the lawsuit, this made it possible to bring the claim 
in the United Kingdom, but was, at the same time, ‘not ideal’.12 She told 
me that ‘to characterize . . . torture as negligence, breach of a duty of 
care, that seems to be minimizing the significance of what happened’. 
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It was, however, the only access point of English law, since to allege that 
the parent company had been directly involved in the acts of torture 
was unviable. In this lawyer’s view, ‘the alternative is to make alle­
gations which will just get kicked out of court straight away and that 
doesn’t really help anybody’.
Shortly after the beginning of the proceedings, the High Court 
ordered a worldwide freezing of Monterrico Metals’ assets.13 In its 
judgement, the court argued that the claimants had demonstrated ‘a 
good arguable case’.14 A ten­week trial was scheduled for October 2011, 
in which more than eighty witnesses, including corporate employees, 
were to be summoned (Leigh Day & Co. 2011). However, the trial ulti­
mately did not take place, as an out­of­court settlement was reached 
shortly beforehand in July 2011 (Skinner et al. 2013: 96). Monterrico 
Metals agreed to pay individual compensation to the claimants, the 
amount of which remained confidential. As part of the agreement, the 
company did not admit any legal responsibility, and the claimants had 
to waive the need for a judgement (Kamphuis 2012: 548). The settlement 
was in line with Leigh Day’s earlier cases; in terms of corporate liability, 
however, it avoided adjudication, which led to disagreements between 
London and Lima.
Out-of-court settlements: A manifestation of justice?
More than thirty years ago, Marc Galanter (1985) described the phe­
nomenon of ‘litigotiation’, which was based on his observation that a 
large proportion of lawsuits in the United States ended in a settlement 
and not in a trial. Galanter wrote: ‘Lawyers find trials distasteful: they 
may bring little financial gain, they disrupt one’s practice, they require 
extensive preparation, and they expose one to risks of losing or reveal­
ing lack of expertise. If trial offers parties hope of complete victory or 
vindication, it also involves additional cost, protracted delay and a risk 
of losing all’ (Galanter 1985: 13). I argue that we can observe this same 
phenomenon with regard to human rights litigation in TNCs’ home 
states today. As mentioned above, transnational lawsuits against TNCs 
have, up to the present day, either been dismissed or settled—but not 
dealt with in trial. There are systemic reasons that favour the settlement 
of such lawsuits, for example the fact that litigation would take years or 
even decades. A London­based NGO employee told me that when she 
started her job she thought these claims should end with a judgement, 
‘but over time I have come to understand that the way the system here 
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works is all geared towards settlements’. In Galanter’s words, there is 
too much uncertainty and too much to lose for the involved parties to 
risk going to trial. The few lawyers taking such cases often work for pro 
bono law firms. For them, settlements offer ‘the best business option’ 
(Kamphuis 2012: 561)—a safe means of recovering their own costs. 
Additionally, settling a case means faster and more secure redress for 
claimants (Kamphuis 2011: 562; Taylor et al. 2010: 17). Katharina Pistor 
has written that ‘[out-of-court] dispute settlement has private and social 
costs as well as benefits’ and warned that ‘[w]hen entire areas of the law 
are carved out from the public space that courts provide, the private 
benefits of out-of-court dispute settlement may well exceed the social 
benefits. In fact, the main beneficiaries of private settlements may not 
even be the parties in the dispute, but their attorneys’ (Pistor 2019: 181; 
see also Shavell 1997).
Furthermore, research on specific lawsuits against TNCs has re­
vealed that out-of-court settlements may impair a legal action’s chances 
of success and may even result in adverse effects. Kim Fortun (2001), 
Veena Das (1995), and Jamie Cassels (1991) analysed the settlement 
reached in the aftermath of the industrial disaster in Bhopal, India.15 
They described the public outcry that followed the settlement,  stating 
that the affected people were deprived of their ‘right to be heard’ (Das 
1995: 146), as they did not have ‘their day in court’. For others, the 
settle ment exemplified how ‘third world life is cheap’ (Cassels 1991: 38; 
see also Fortun 2001: xviii) measured against corporate profits. In the 
Bhopal case, the settlement was said to be an ineffective remedy (Skinner 
2014: 206).
Further research on out-of-court settlements has questioned the 
long-term benefits of such agreements. In his research on the Ok Tedi 
mine in Papua New Guinea, Stuart Kirsch (2006: 21–22, 2007: 308) traced 
the challenges in enforcing concessions made by TNCs under such 
settle ments, which may go beyond financial compensation. Further­
more, various authors have raised issues of representation that have 
emerged in such settlements. This aspect became evident, for example, 
in a claim against Newmont Mining in the United States for a mer­
cury spill in Choropampa, Peru. The involved lawyers were alleged 
to be pursuing the representation of claimants as a business model 
( Kamphuis 2012: 561–562; Li 2017: 185–187). Out-of-court settlements in 
the context of transnational legal activism have thus been criticized for 
various reasons.
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Social tensions and allegations of ‘being bought’
The Monterrico claim revealed further difficulties. In the local pro­
test movement in Piura, the settlement raised major issues as it led to 
disputes and social tensions in the affected communities. Since the 
agreement was confidential, the claimants were not allowed to speak 
about its content. At the same time, however, Leigh Day and Fedepaz 
made details of the settlement public. The British law firm saw it as a 
successful result of its efforts and obviously wanted to report on this 
(Leigh Day & Co. 2011). Fedepaz attempted to interpret the settlement as 
an admission of guilt, even though the company rejected any liability. 
David Velazco, one of Fedepaz’ lawyers, told me that ‘beyond the fact 
that in the out­of­court settlement it is said that the company does not 
recognize responsibility, if it does not recognize responsibility, why 
does it pay?’ Fedepaz published a press release taking up this argu­
mentation (Fedepaz 2011).
Consequently, it became public knowledge that the company paid 
individual compensation to the claimants, but the people who received 
money were not allowed to explain themselves and clarify matters. 
Rumours circulated within the comunidades, resulting in allegations 
against the claimants of ‘having collaborated’ with the corporation. Mar 
Pérez, a lawyer working with the Coordinadora, recounted that some 
claimants had held positions as local leaders. They were discredited 
as a result of the settlement, because ‘it appeared as if they had been 
bought, that the company had covered their mouths, and that they were 
delegitimized before the community’. Thus, the financial compensation 
was beneficial to the individual claimants, but in the broader context 
it had adverse impacts in and on the affected communities and on the 
protest movement. From the point of view of the Peruvian human rights 
movement, the settlement’s ‘private benefits’ for the individual claim­
ants exceeded the ‘social benefits’ for the communities, in Pistor’s (2019: 
181) terms.
Court cases expose individual claimants and can lead to the indi­
vidualization of broader conflicts, regardless of whether they result in 
a judgement or a settlement. This tendency towards individualization 
is a major challenge that arises from the juridification of social strug­
gles. For the Peruvian lawyers, it was uncontested that the claimants 
in the Monterrico case had a right to individual financial compensa­
tion because they saw this as an opportunity that could ‘change the 
affected people’s lives’. To avoid friction in the communities, however, 
the  Peruvian lawyers attempted to bring the issue of the comunidad 
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into the claim in London as well. For them, the case had a ‘commu­
nity dimension’ (dimensión comunitaria) since the abuses occurred in 
the context of a broader mining conflict. One lawyer from Lima told 
me how they explained to their British counterpart that a comunidad 
campesina possesses legal personality in Peruvian law. Thus, in their 
opinion,  Peruvian law would have allowed the attempt to go beyond 
individual compensation payments and to include the comunidad as an 
injured party in order to avoid social tension on the ground.16 However, 
this aspect was not included in the claim in London.
As specialists in transnational claims against TNCs, Leigh Day’s 
lawyers ‘represent people all over the world fighting for justice and 
challenging powerful corporate and government interests’ (Leigh Day 
2020: 2). They ‘[push] the boundaries of the law to hold the powerful to 
account’ (Leigh Day 2020: 2), and they ‘are not afraid to take on daunt­
ing challenges’ since they ‘believe passionately that every individual 
and community, no matter who they are or where they live, is entitled 
to defend their human rights, including their right to justice’ (Leigh 
Day 2020: 4). Working on a pro bono basis, the firm has been involved 
in litigation against various UK-based corporations. In most of these 
cases, Leigh Day has represented large groups of claimants, such as 
communities affected by environmental pollution. Compared to the 
Monterrico claim, the risk of the claimants being accused within their 
own community of having been bought off by means of compensa­
tion payments was much lower in these cases. As various authors have 
discussed, however, the law firm experienced problems in other cases 
it took on, for example in the process of distributing compensation 
payments among large groups of claimants in the Ivory Coast and in 
Ni geria (Blackburn 2017: 26; Brett 2018: 56–58; MacManus 2018: 122, 
137–138).
With regard to its practice of representing foreign claimants before 
courts in the United Kingdom, Leigh Day wrote: ‘Understanding clients’ 
needs is our first priority. We act on our clients’ instructions and in their 
best interests’ (Leigh Day 2020: 5). To secure financial compensation is 
at the centre of the firm’s efforts. I argue, however, that the Monterrico 
case raises questions about legal representation and about power rela­
tions in this transnational collaboration between clients and lawyers. 
The lawyers from London were the legal experts in the case, but how 
much did they know about the local circumstances in Peru? How did 
they know what would be an effective remedy for the affected people? 
And would the claimants have been able to assert themselves against 
the recommendations of the British lawyers? I argue that this kind of 
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client­lawyer collaboration presupposes a balance of power in relations 
between the involved parties. As in other transnational lawsuits, claim­
ants in the Monterrico case were from a marginalized area and had no 
litigation experience. They were ‘one-shotters’ (Galanter 1974: 97) who 
depended entirely on their lawyers’ knowledge and recommendations.
By contrast, the lawyers working with Fedepaz attempted to take 
into account not only the instructions of the individual ‘clients’, but per­
ceived the lawsuit in a wider context, in which the communities played 
an important role, too. They have worked with these communities in 
Piura for years and saw the claim as part of a broader strategy to sup­
port them in their struggle against the mining project. To the Peruvian 
human rights lawyers, a claim does not have to be financially viable, 
but rather politically decisive. While financial compensation for the 
claimants was one of their hopes of the proceedings in London, which 
was therefore fulfilled with the settlement, thus obtaining remedy for 
the claimants, in a sense, this financial compensation caused social 
tensions. The Peruvian lawyers had feared this, but could not control 
it, because they were not a party to the proceedings in London. I argue 
that this called into question the effectiveness of the remedy.
Settled in London, contested in Lima
Beyond the discussion of financial compensation, the Monterrico case 
revealed further discrepancies between London and Lima, which de­
rived from the settlement itself and its legal function. One of Leigh 
Day’s lawyers wrote in an article that ‘academics and campaigners 
have expressed concern that the settlement of litigation enables deep­ 
pocketed [T]NCs to avoid being held to account at trial and deprives 
the system of binding legal precedents’ (Meeran 2011: 24). In his view, 
however, ‘negotiation and settlement are . . . integral to civil compensa­
tion claims’, and ‘the substantial expense and reputational risks arising 
from litigation provide a potentially powerful deterrent against [T]NC 
wrongdoing’ (Meeran 2011: 24). In his opinion, therefore, even a settled 
case can constitute what others have called a ‘litigation threat’ (see, for 
example, Schrempf­Stirling and Wettstein 2017: 556).
The Peruvian lawyers, in turn, considered the Monterrico case’s 
‘deterrent effect’ to be much more modest, in particular because the 
mining company Río Blanco remained active in Piura after the settle-
ment. They regretted that no judgement had been reached on the com­
pany’s responsibility. David, one of Fedepaz’ lawyers, told me: ‘We 
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are not very much convinced of the extrajudicial agreement because, 
as human rights defenders, what we want is that the truth is publicly 
known and that justice is established by official acts’. The Peruvian law­
yers described the British lawyers’ work as ‘super-efficient’ and their 
legal strategy as ‘brilliant’. At the same time, their legal expectations 
remained unfulfilled due to the settlement and the missed adjudication.
These differences between London and Lima may stem from dif­
ferent legal cultures. Most of Peru’s human rights lawyers specialize in 
either criminal law or constitutional law. Civil cases are seen as a less 
feasible option, because the burden of proof is high, litigation is even 
more lengthy than in criminal cases, and, most importantly, the role 
of the state is less prominent. In constitutional claims, the state is di­
rectly addressed and its duty to protect the population’s rights is raised 
(Affolter, this issue). Criminal law deals with violations of a society’s 
legal norms, which the state prosecutes and sanctions, mostly ex  officio. 
Civil suits, in turn, are disputes between private parties. The state acts 
in these cases only as a kind of mediator who hears cases and deter­
mines whether the claimants’ compensation demands are justified. 
Consequently, civil law is less suitable for making political demands 
on the state. The Peruvian human rights movement therefore mainly 
utilizes criminal and constitutional complaints to persuade the state to 
take responsibility and to respond through institutional mechanisms 
to human rights abuses, thereby bringing about social change through 
legal mobilization.
This experience has shaped the Peruvian lawyers’ expectations of 
the Monterrico case—a lawsuit dealt with under civil law in a common 
law country. In contrast to Galanter’s statement that ‘lawyers find trials 
distasteful’ (1985: 13), David underlined the importance of a trial and of 
a judgement. ‘Justice is to know the truth.’, he told me. To him, this in­
cludes, on the one hand, that the injured parties learn who is responsi­
ble for the abuses committed. It implies an official review of the events, 
since a lawsuit is a form of public acknowledgment of a crime. For 
 Fedepaz, pursuit of civil cases abroad is only a ‘subsidiary option’, since 
the NGO’s primary purpose is to bring cases of human rights violations 
to the domestic justice system and to demand an official response by the 
Peruvian authorities. To them, adjudication is a crucial part of obtaining 
an effective remedy; it is what makes law effective for them. Since legal 
proceedings in Peru had made no progress, Fedepaz had hoped that the 
lawsuit in London would contribute to the official acknowledgment and 
give an answer as to whether the corporation holds responsibility for 
the abuses. Yet, in the pre­trial phase, which the Monterrico case went 
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through, only procedural issues were discussed. Since no trial was held, 
the issue of corporate responsibility remained untouched.
Expectations of law
Sally Merry has written that law works not only by rule enforcement 
and punishment ‘but also by its capacity to construct authoritative 
images of social relationships and actions’ (1990: 9). In this regard, the 
Peruvian lawyers attempted to construct the company’s responsibility 
as an ‘authoritative image’ by filing a lawsuit abroad. The Monterrico 
case has revealed, however, how out­of­court settlements circumvent 
mechanisms laid down in law, namely the discussion of chains of re­
sponsibility and the attribution of liability. Adjudication is key in con­
structing ‘authoritative images’. As a legal mechanism, it leads to the 
public recognition and acknowledgment that abuses were committed. 
The chains of responsibility that transnational lawsuits seek to establish 
are only addressed in a trial. Settlements avoid the risk of losing in a 
trial, but, at the same time, they make adjudication and the attribution 
of responsibility impossible (Eckert 2016; Taylor et al. 2010: 17). Fur­
thermore, settlements prevent precedents from being established. They 
hinder the emergence of a body of law with regard to corporate liability 
(Oxford Pro Bono Publico 2008: iv). In the Monterrico case, as in other 
settled cases, the court did not deal with the question of whether the 
parent company actually owes a ‘duty of care’ for subsidiaries’ activi­
ties, and the underlying attempt to establish a chain of responsibility 
between the company’s headquarters and the mine site in Peru there­
fore remained unaddressed.
This case confirmed earlier experiences with settlements, which 
have demonstrated that this practice allows TNCs to claim ‘that they 
have done “nothing wrong”’ (Blackburn 2017: 36), despite facing legal 
proceedings lasting years. Out-of-court settlements are a form of ‘corpo­
rate antipolitics’ (Sawyer 2004: 118), since the political and moral claims 
underlying the lawsuits against TNCs remain undiscussed (Kamphuis 
2012: 562). I argue that the parent companies would not have been able 
to avoid these political issues in a trial, because the attribution of re­
sponsibility would have been at the centre of any trial.
Adjudication includes the attribution of responsibility, and it is pre­
cisely this aspect that makes the law effective. Out-of-court settlements, 
by contrast, are ‘harmony law models’ in Laura Nader’s sense (1999: 305, 
308). Like other types of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), they are 
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aimed at avoiding trial and adjudication, and, instead, to reach a con­
sensus between the parties to the conflict. Following Nader’s approach, 
‘harmony law models’ aim ostensibly at balance and reconciliation 
rather than punishment. In fact, however, they lead to the silencing of 
people and are part of a ‘hegemonic control system’ (Nader 1999: 308). 
We can observe precisely these characteristics when lawsuits against 
TNCs are settled out of court.
Settlements are often negotiated in the private area, rather than 
publicly before court. As Pistor noted, ‘[s]omething is lost . . . when 
cases are resolved not in a courtroom where they can be seen, dissected, 
and critiqued by others, but in its shadows’ (2019: 180). Settlements do 
not take place on a level playing field, but allow powerful actors such 
as TNCs to utilize their power (Kirsch 2018: 38; Taylor et al. 2010: 17, 
27). This is not to say, of course, that cases dealt with in court always 
take place on a level playing field and that the legal system is equally 
accessible to everyone. Different obstacles may lead the ‘haves [to] come 
out ahead’ in courtrooms, to come back to Galanter’s (1974) terminology. 
Research has revealed, however, that there is hope for marginalized 
people involved in litigation if they succeed in altering the ‘legal oppor­
tunity structures’ (Gloppen 2018; Wilson and Rodríguez Cordero 2006). 
In this way, law may become ‘emancipatory’ (Santos 2002) for social 
movements. The Peruvian lawyers derived their expectations of the 
claim in London from this hope. Their aim was to provoke an official 
answer that would determine who bears responsibility for the abuses. 
This is what law as a social practice can, in their opinion, contribute to. 
With the removal of the case from the public sphere of the court, how­
ever, and its transformation into a settlement, the law did not become 
effective in this sense and their legal expectations were not fulfilled.
Conclusion
The Monterrico case exemplifies what can be gained and what is lost on 
the transnational judicial journey from the comunidades in Piura to the 
courtrooms of London, particularly with regard to the challenges that 
arise from the practice of out­of­court settlements. The fact that settle­
ments are reached out of court does not mean that they necessarily take 
place outside the sphere of law. They do, however, testify to a different 
understanding of law, one that focuses on negotiation rather than on 
adjudication and aims toward compromise rather than sanction. For 
the involved British lawyers, settlements are an inherent part of legal 
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culture, but for their Peruvian counterparts, the settlement impeded 
the search for justice and determination of the truth. The Peruvian 
human rights lawyers understand obtaining effective remedy to entail 
a determination of who is responsible for the offenses and not just the 
payment of individual financial compensation. In their view, in order 
to be ‘effective’, a remedy should take a broader approach and include 
consideration about the community as a whole, not just the individuals. 
For them, the power of law lies in its ability to grant official recognition 
of suffering. This is what law can achieve as a social practice, but only 
if law’s mechanisms are enforced through adjudication.
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Notes
1. Additional information had been gathered in an interview with a British 
lawyer involved in the transnational lawsuit that I discuss in this article. Unfortu­
nately, he later withdrew all his statements.
2. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, article 2(3)(a).
3. 28 U.S. Code § 1350. Alien’s action for tort.
4. Owusu v. Jackson ([2005] ECR 1383) (see also Blackburn 2017: 38–39).
5. Ecumenical Foundation for Development and Peace.
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6. Guerrero v. Monterrico, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB).
7. An exception to this was Chandler v. Cape Plc, a case concluded in 2012 with 
the judgement that a UK parent company could owe a duty of care to employees of 
subsidiaries abroad (Chandler v. Cape Plc [2012] EWCA Civ 525).
8. Guerrero v. Monterrico, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB), para. 8 (see also Zerk 2014: 23).
9. Cited in: Guerrero v. Monterrico, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB), para. 10.
10. Guerrero v. Monterrico, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB), para. 20.i (see also Skinner 
et al. 2013: 95).
11. Guerrero v. Monterrico, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB), para. 20.iv.
12. Various authors have written from a legal perspective about the transla­
tion ‘from torture to tort’ in transnational lawsuits (see, for example, Scott 2001; 
Augenstein 2018).
13. Guerrero v. Monterrico, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB), para. 41 (see also Kamphuis 
2012: 547).
14. Guerrero v. Monterrico, [2009] EWHC 2475 (QB), para. 26 (see also Kamphuis 
2011: 77; Leigh Day & Co. 2011).
15. This settlement was reached in the TNC’s host state and thus took place 
under different circumstances than the others cases discussed in this article. Never-
theless, the Bhopal example revealed general difficulties with settlements.
16. The claim was filed under Peruvian and English law. The High Court would 
have had to decide which law was applicable.
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